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LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY 
KENNETH WARD

 
ABSTRACT 
This essay develops an institutional perspective to consider 
limitations on judicial authority. Rather than assume that judicial 
decisions put an end to disagreements about what the Constitution 
means, this perspective focuses on the political contests that occur 
after judges make disputed interpretations of constitutional law. 
This perspective shows that scholars both exaggerate the role of 
judicial review in enforcing constitutional limits and underestimate 
the political instability that follows from difficulty in challenging 
controversial judicial holdings. Together, these claims are the 
beginning of an argument defending a form of legislative supremacy 
that would allow Congress and the President to override judicial 
precedents through ordinary legislation, after which judges would 
be bound to apply that legislative interpretation of constitional law. 
This essay develops an institutional perspective to argue for limitations 
on judicial authority. Rather than assume that judicial decisions put an end 
to disagreements about what the Constitution means, this perspective 
focuses on the political contests that occur after judges make disputed 
interpretations of constitutional law. This perspective shows that scholars 
both exaggerate the role of judicial review in enforcing constitutional 
limits and underestimate the political instability that follows from 
difficulty in challenging controversial judicial holdings. Together, these 
claims are the beginning of an argument defending a form of legislative 
supremacy that would allow Congress and the President to override 
judicial precedents through ordinary legislation, after which judges would 
be bound to apply that legislative interpretation of constitutional law.
1
  
 
 
  Associate Professor, Texas State University. I would like to thank Mark Graber, Ken Grasso, 
Paul Kens, Charles Cameron and Laylah Zurek for helpful comments. 
 1. I assume that a constitutional amendment would be necessary to institute a legislative 
override and recognize that there is little chance that such an amendment could be ratified in the 
foreseeable future. My proposal is intended to provoke discussion of the proper extent of judicial 
authority and the consequences institutional design has for constitutional politics. I have not defined 
the contours of the override process in order to focus attention on the normative argument. Although 
my analysis does not specify how the legislative override would work, I envision a form of veto in 
which legislators reject the Court‘s interpretation of the Constitution and reinstitute the prior status 
quo. Such a process would retain features of the current system that advance important rule of law 
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People are reluctant to consider legislative supremacy because they 
fear majoritarian tyranny. The notion of a legislative override evokes 
Robert Bork‘s attempt to eviscerate judicial authority in order to advance a 
conservative agenda or, perhaps, Theodore Roosevelt‘s attempt to do so to 
advance a progressive one.
2
 It might seem that a legislative override would 
give elected officials final authority to say what the Constitution means 
and allow them to define the limits to their authority. But this is not the 
case. Although a legislative override would make it easier for elected 
officials to challenge the status quo that judges set when they interpret the 
Constitution, there are institutional considerations that will make it 
difficult to pass overrides.   
An institutional perspective also helps us to distinguish judicial 
supremacy, which is at odds with legislative supremacy, and judicial 
review, which is not. The legislative override does not eliminate judicial 
review and therefore my argument is more moderate than Mark Tushnet‘s 
proposal
3
 to remove considerations of constitutional interpretation from 
the Article III jurisdiction of federal judges and Jeremy Waldron‘s 
argument
4
 that Europeans should not adopt the American model of a 
judicially enforceable Bill of Rights.  
Finally, my argument addresses two divergent strands of the literature 
on judicial supremacy. It supports popular constitutionalists who reject 
judicial supremacy as contrary to citizens having final word on what the 
Constitution means.
5
 By making it easier to contest judicial interpretations 
of constitutional law, a legislative override should increase the occasions 
of institutional conflict that yield appeals to the public. But it would do so 
without leaving the law unsettled. My argument thus addresses the 
concerns of judicial supremacists such as Larry Alexander and Frederick 
Schauer, who contend that judicial supremacy promotes the Judiciary‘s 
 
 
values. See Larry Alexander and Frederick Schauer, On Extra Judicial Constitutional Interpretation 
110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
 2. ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 117–19 (1996); Theodore Roosevelt, 
Judges and Progress, OUTLOOK 40 (Jan. 6, 1912). 
 3. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 
 4. JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 3, 4, 7, 159–61 (1999).  
 5. Popular constitutionalists such as Larry Kramer and Neal Devins and Louis Fisher endorse 
coordinate review; they believe that elected officials are under no obligation to defer to judicial 
interpretations of constitutional law when exercising their own independent authority. They contend 
that American constitutionalism is designed such that judges and elected institutions will sometimes 
advance conflicting views of what the Constitution means and, when such conflicts arise, these 
officials have an incentive to appeal for public support of their favored view. See LARRY KRAMER, 
THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 58 (2004); NEAL 
DEVINS & LOUIS FISHER, THE DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 217 (2004).   
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performance of an important settlement function.
6
 A legislative override 
would not impair people‘s ability to know what the law is and, at the same 
time, would correct for the instability of the current regime in which some 
citizens believe themselves marginalized—perhaps even disenfranchised—
because of the obstacles they face in challenging judicial interpretations of 
constitutional law. 
The essay has four sections. The first section distinguishes judicial 
supremacy from judicial review. The second illustrates how the debate on 
judicial supremacy focuses on the narrow problem of who settles 
questions of constitutional law. The third develops a broader institutional 
perspective to illustrate why elected officials would continue to be bound 
by constitutional limits if we were to allow legislative overrides of judicial 
interpretations of constitutional law. The final section uses this perspective 
to argue that a legislative override would promote political stability, by 
encouraging the political participation that popular constitutionalists seek 
without undermining the settlement function that grounds the strongest 
argument for judicial supremacy.  
I. JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
Constitutional theorists often discuss judicial supremacy under the 
rubric of judicial review.
7
 A judge exercises judicial review when, in 
deciding a case, she refuses to give effect to what is deemed an 
unconstitutional act of another institution of government. Judicial 
supremacy describes what happens after judges exercise judicial review. It 
defines the status judicial precedents have when challenged by elected 
institutions, and it thus describes the political field on which judges and 
elected officials contest their disagreements about what the Constitution 
means.  
Judicial review seems to imply judicial supremacy to the extent that a 
judge cannot invalidate an act of an elected official without her view of the 
Constitution having greater authority than the view that is invalidated. And 
we would settle the question of judicial supremacy, if we were to amend 
 
 
 6. See generally Alexander and Schauer, supra note 1.  
 7. Keith Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and 
Responses, 80 N.C. L.REV. 773, 783–86 (2002). Whittington also distinguishes judicial supremacy and 
judicial review. But he follows the tendency among constitutional theorists to frame the problem in 
terms of how much deference elected officials owe to judicial decisions. And, as he notes, the debate 
focuses on the question of who settles the question when institutions disagree about what the 
Constitution means. I use judicial supremacy to characterize the political environment in which 
institutions advance competing interpretations. 
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the Constitution to eliminate judicial review by forbidding the Court from 
considering the Constitution when it is asked to give effect to the actions 
of other political institutions.
8
 
But judicial review would survive in a regime that allowed judges to 
interpret the Constitution subject to a legislative override. Judicial 
authority would be circumscribed to some extent, because legislators 
could prevent judges from applying their interpretations of the 
Constitution to future cases.
9
 As we will see in the third section, however, 
the effectiveness of judicial review will depend on political variables that 
determine how easy it will be for legislators to, in fact, override a judicial 
precedent.
10
 For now, we only note that judges could exercise judicial 
review and have some chance of sustaining their interpretations of 
constitutional law, even if we were to deny their decisions any 
presumption of authority.  
And this suggests a final preliminary point: the essay uses the term 
legislative supremacy only to characterize the institutional position of 
legislators relative to judges, as it pertains to ongoing contests about what 
the Constitution means. It makes no claim about who should have final 
authority or where sovereignty is located in our system of government. 
This distinction is important. Kramer, for example, rejects both judicial 
and legislative supremacy because he believes that final authority should 
rest with the people themselves and not their agents.
11
 But we will see that 
a legislative override would not give legislators final word about the 
 
 
 8. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 175. Tushnet makes this proposal. We will see that Tushnet is 
interested in whose view of the Constitution should prevail when we disagree about what the 
Constitution means, and this might explain why he views legislative supremacy as an alternative to 
judicial review. Many scholars, by contrast, mistakenly assume that a legislative override would 
eliminate judicial review and reject the argument for legislative supremacy, fearing that elected 
officials would be free to violate the Constitution.  
 9. The essay does not consider the question of what would happen if legislators could reverse a 
decision that invalidates a law as applied to a particular case. Most constitutional theorists assume that 
judicial decisions should be final as they apply to the litigants. Although there might be arguments for 
curtailing this authority, they would seem to be in conflict with fundamental assumptions about the 
rule of law and, in turn, the separation of powers. Legislators would not be bound by their own law, if 
they can excuse select litigants from its reach.  
 10. To be effective, legislative authority does not depend on legislators being able to override 
particular decisions in the way that judges need this authority to make judicial review effective. 
Legislators can check the Court without overriding particular decisions. They have means for securing 
judicial compliance, such as threats of impeachment, loss of jurisdiction, or even non-compliance with 
judicial decisions—that judges do not have when legislators refuse to comply with their decisions. 
Consequently, in a regime characterized by legislative supremacy, legislators would be able to advance 
their views of what the Constitution means, even if they cannot reverse the holdings of particular 
cases.   
 11. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 58. 
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Constitution; it would only reshape the political contests that ensue after 
judges advance controversial interpretations of constitutional law. Indeed, 
it would seem that Kramer should endorse such a reform, if it would 
increase the likelihood that the people will be called on to resolve 
disagreements between their elected and judicial agents.
12
  
II. THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE 
RESOLUTION OF DISAGREEMENTS 
The debate about judicial supremacy focuses on who resolves 
disagreements about constitutional doctrine. We will see that this focus 
prevents theorists from considering how the institutional position of judges 
and elected officials influences their interactions and the consequences this 
has for our understanding of the appropriate extent of judicial authority. 
Consider three types of claims that address judicial supremacy in terms 
of how we resolve disagreements: (1) descriptive claims that identify the 
institutions that have in fact resolved disagreements; (2) substantive claims 
that assess institutional authority based on an expectation of what 
constitutional doctrine should be; and (3) structural claims that assess such 
authority based on an expectation of how institutions might contribute to 
the process that resolves disagreements.  
(1) Descriptive claims address whether judges have final say about 
what the Constitution means. They consider the influence non judicial 
actors have in shaping constitutional doctrine. Neal Devins and Louis 
Fisher, for example, reject judicial supremacy as a description of 
constitutional politics. They contend that ―constitutional law is produced 
by many forces: political and legal, non judicial and judicial, national and 
local, public and private.‖13  
J. Mitchell Pickerill uses the term judicial primacy to describe the role 
of the Court and judicial review in determining constitutional meaning. 
The Court, according to this view,  
―has the primary institutional responsibility for interpreting the 
Constitution, and that Congress‘s motivations and its likelihood of 
engaging in constitutional construction are limited by the 
majoritarian and representative nature of the institution. . . . [T]he 
 
 
 12. Id. at 250–51. Kramer identifies alternative institutional mechanisms for advancing the ends 
of popular constitutionalism but does not believe that constitutional reform is a realistic prospect given 
the obstacles presented by the Article V amendment process.  
 13. DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 5, at 217. 
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Court is not ‗supreme‘ in the sense that it always has final say and is 
unaccountable to Congress . . . .‖14  
Similarly, there is a rich literature that describes the conditions that 
explain why elected officials would defer to judicial interpretations of 
constitutional law. This literature suggests that the second face of power 
characterizes judges‘ relationship to elected officials.15 Judicial decisions, 
according to this view, significantly determine the meaning of the 
Constitution, but the decisions themselves reflect the preferences of other 
institutional actors.
16
 
We will also see that Kramer uses descriptive claims as part of a 
normative argument against judicial supremacy. Kramer contends that it is 
only fairly recently that judicial supremacy comes to characterize 
American constitutional politics.
17
 He examines various conflicts about 
what the Constitution means to illustrate that through most of our history 
elected officials were more likely to assert their own authority to interpret 
the Constitution and thus played a greater role in the process that 
determines its meaning.
18
   
(2) Substantive claims emphasize values that some theorists believe 
constitutional law should reflect. They assess judicial authority based on 
how judges have resolved particular questions of constitutional 
interpretation, expectations of how judges will decide such questions, or 
theories of democratic government that entail particular conclusions about 
constitutional doctrine.  
Substantive claims often arise in the context of fights about 
constitutional doctrine. Justices, for example, have claimed final authority 
to say what the Constitution means in defending precedents such as those 
that integrated schools,
19
 secured the right of women to have abortions,
20
 
 
 
 14. J. MITCHELL PICKERILL, CONSTITUTIONAL DELIBERATION IN CONGRESS: THE IMPACT OF 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A SEPARATED SYSTEM 152 (2004) (internal citations omitted). 
 15. Peter Bacharach & Morton S. Baratz, Two Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. SCI. REV 947, 947–
52 (1962). Bacharach and Baratz contrast the first face of power in which someone uses power to 
advance a particular end with the second face of power in which power is manifest in ―non events.‖ 
Power, according to this view, is manifest, when one institution defers to another institutional actor by 
refusing to use their authority to advance preferences that conflict with the preferences of those other 
actors. 
 16. See, e.g., John A. Ferejohn & Larry Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: 
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 977–78 (2002); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK 
KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 138–81 (1998); WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF 
JUDICIAL STRATEGY 123–75 (1964). 
 17. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 8. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).  
 20. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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and narrowed religious exemptions to generally applicable laws.
21
 And 
conversely, people who challenge such precedents reject claims of judicial 
supremacy. The First Things Symposium provides a notable example.
22
 
The symposiasts appeal to Lincoln‘s famous challenge to Dred Scott; 
Lincoln accepted the authority of the Court‘s holding as it applied to the 
parties but asserted his own authority to interpret the Constitution 
independently in the exercise of his constitutional powers.
23
 Because these 
claims are so closely associated with doctrinal disputes, they inevitably 
focus on how we should resolve such disagreements.
24
  
Other theorists make substantive claims that look beyond particular 
doctrinal fights to assess judicial authority based on a prediction of 
whether judges will advance a compelling understanding of constitutional 
law. Ronald Dworkin, for example, defends an expansive conception of 
judicial authority because he expects that judges will make better 
decisions than legislators regarding the conditions necessary to secure 
equal status for citizens.
25
 By contrast, Robert Bork and Mark Tushnet, 
theorists on the opposite side of the political spectrum, argue that judicial 
review should be significantly curtailed or eliminated based on their 
assessments of the values that judges are likely to advance.
26
  
 
 
 21. Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 22. THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS, (Richard John 
Neuhaus ed. 1997) [hereinafter THE END OF DEMOCRACY]. The Symposium addresses a wide range of 
issues relating to how citizens should respond to Supreme Court decisions they believe outside of the 
Court‘s legitimate authority. The themes of the original symposium continue to be explored in a 
successor volume, THE END OF DEMOCRACY? II A CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY (Mitchell S. Muncy ed., 
1999) [hereinafter THE END OF DEMOCRACY? II].   
 23. Robert H. Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? supra note 22, at 17; 
The Editors of FIRST THINGS, Correspondence, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? supra note 22, at 119–
20; Russell Hittinger, Government By the “Thoughtful Part,” in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? II, supra 
note 22, at 22–23, 34–35; Hadley Arkes, Prudent Warning and Imprudent Reactions, in THE END OF 
DEMOCRACY? II, supra note 22, at 80; Robert P. George, Justice, Legitimacy and Allegiance, in THE 
END OF DEMOCRACY? II, supra note 22, at 102–03. 
 24. And to the extent they make the claim that elected institutions should resolve ambiguous 
constitutional provisions, they do so based on the expectation that elected institutions will reach better 
decisions. See Gary D. Glenn, The Venerable Argument Against Judicial Usurpation, in THE END OF 
DEMOCRACY? II, supra note 22, at 110–12; George W. Carey, The Philadelphia Constitution: Dead or 
Alive, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? II, supra note 22, at 235. 
 25. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM‘S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION 16, 34 (1996). 
 26. BORK, supra note 2, at 22, 96–119; TUSHNET, supra note 3. Tushnet‘s argument is like 
Dworkin‘s in that he examines whether an institutional process will promote certain values he 
associates with the Declaration of Independence. He concludes that the Court‘s record does not give us 
reason to override a presumption favoring democratic decision-making. On the other hand, Tushnet‘s 
argument is structural to the extent he claims that the process of popular government better reflects 
those same values. 
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On the one hand, Bork and Tushnet are unusual in considering 
institutional reforms that limit judicial authority. On the other hand, the 
ideological quality of their arguments, especially Bork‘s,27 reinforces our 
tendency to confuse the question of what authority judges should have and 
the question of how judges should interpret the Constitution.
28
 Each 
attacks judicial supremacy in order to advance a particular conception of 
constitutional law. This distracts attention from important structural 
considerations that should inform our assessment of whether to limit 
judicial authority by assigning priority to legislative interpretations of 
constitutional law.  
Kramer makes a different type of substantive claim. His argument 
resembles those made by the First Things symposiasts in that he wants to 
counteract the increasing tendency of citizens to defer to Supreme Court 
interpretations of the Constitution and thereby reduce the threshold—at 
least marginally—at which political challenges to the Court succeed.29 But 
where the symposiasts seek to challenge particular Supreme Court 
precedents, Kramer aims at the claim of judicial supremacy itself.
30
 He 
contends that people have the authority to say what the Constitution means 
and should reclaim this authority from the Court.
31
  
Kramer, however, says surprisingly little about why we should favor 
his alternative interpretation of Article III. He associates judicial 
supremacy with the view that judges make better decisions than legislators 
and promote stability by resolving disputes with finality.
32
 But he does not 
address these questions.
33
 Indeed, he indicates that they do not matter all 
that much, because judicial supremacy‘s authority as a normative construct 
depends on our attitude about self government, whether we defer to the 
Court‘s understanding of the Constitution or force the Court to accede to 
 
 
 27. Bork‘s argument is polemical and clearly intended for a broader audience than the scholarly 
community that tends to dominate debates in constitutional theory. 
 28. I discuss this tendency infra pp. 335–36.  
 29. See KRAMER, supra note 5, at 233. He considers judicial supremacy  
―an ideological tenet whose whole purpose is to persuade ordinary citizens that, whatever 
they may think about the Justices‘ constitutional rulings, it is not their place to gainsay the 
Court. . . . The object of judicial supremacy is . . . to maximize the Court‘s authority by 
inculcating an attitude of deference and submission to its judgments.‖ 
 30. Id. at 249–53. 
 31. Id. at 246–47. 
 32. Id. at 188–89, 222, 234–36. Kramer associates the appeal of judicial supremacy with two 
conditions that arise in the late twentieth century: (1) a distrust of popular government that becomes 
heightened with the rise of fascism; and (2) the need to preserve stability in a time of highly partisan 
conflicts.  
 33. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 227–48. Instead, he suggests that judicial supremacy needs special 
justification because popular constitutionalism is more consistent with our republican commitments.  
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the authority of the People.
34
 Judicial supremacy, according to this view, is 
a question that we resolve through political action, and Kramer‘s history 
aims to help citizens resolve the question correctly.  
(3) Structural Claims emphasize the process we should use to resolve 
disagreements about the Constitution and are less concerned about 
particular questions of constitutional doctrine. This is not to say that 
structural claims have no concern with substance or that we can cleanly 
disentangle the structural and substantive aspects of such claims. We use 
the distinction to indicate that the arguments under consideration 
emphasize consequences of institutional authority that do not depend on 
how officials—whether judicial or elected—decide any particular question 
of constitutional law.  
Structural claims are like substantive claims in that they associate 
judicial supremacy with a need to resolve disagreements about the 
Constitution. Indeed, some structural claims defend judicial supremacy 
based on the need to enforce the substantive limits the Constitution 
imposes on elected institutions.
35
 Others focus more on the problem of 
disagreement itself, as opposed to how those disagreements should be 
resolved. Consider, for example, Alexander and Schauer‘s justification of 
judicial supremacy. They contend that we have an obligation to defer to 
Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional law, because the Court 
performs a valuable settlement function by resolving our disagreements 
and thereby promoting the good of social coordination.
36
  
The opponents of judicial supremacy have also emphasized the need to 
resolve disagreements. Waldron defends legislation as a process that treats 
people with equal respect by ensuring that each person‘s view is counted 
the same in the process that resolves disagreements.
37
 Others contend that 
by giving elected officials and citizens greater say about what the 
Constitution means, we increase the readiness with which people defer to 
constitutional authority.
38
 These theorists suggest that when people see 
 
 
 34. KRAMER, supra note 5, at 241–48.  
 35. DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 291–92 (1986); Thomas I. 
Emerson, The Power of Congress to Change Constitutional Decisions of the Supreme Court: The 
Human Life Bill, 77 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 142; ROBERT A. SCIGLIANO, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
PRESIDENCY 16 (1971). 
 36. Alexander and Schauer, supra note 1, at 1359.  
 37. WALDRON, supra note 4, at 3, 4, 7, 159–61. 
 38. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 5, at 228–30; SUSAN R. BURGESS, CONTEST FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY, 121–26 (1992); STEPHEN MACEDO, THE NEW RIGHT v. THE 
CONSTITUTION 59 (1986). 
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themselves as responsible for the content of constitutional law, they will 
be more willing to undertake the obligations it imposes.
39
 
Structural arguments take institutions seriously in that they approach 
the question of judicial supremacy with an eye to the consequences that 
follow from different political arrangements. They recognize that we use 
institutions to address disagreements about what the Constitution means 
and therefore should assess these institutions based on considerations that 
are at least somewhat independent of how we want them to settle 
particular issues of constitutional doctrine.  
Nonetheless, these structural arguments approach the question of 
judicial supremacy from a similar perspective as the descriptive and 
substantive approaches. They focus on the need to resolve disagreements 
about what the Constitution means. While substantive approaches view 
disagreements as aberrations that we overcome by empowering an 
institution that is likely to interpret the Constitution correctly, structural 
approaches tend to treat disagreement as a disease that the political 
structure has to eradicate and consider different methods of doing so. 
This is not to say that these scholars believe that our disagreements will 
end once judges or other institutional actors make a final decision. Indeed, 
they are sensitive to the depth of these disagreements and know that they 
survive our attempts to resolve them. But they treat institutions as 
independent variables and consider the different ways these variables 
influence the resolution of disagreements.
40
 Therefore, they miss 
significant consequences that flow from the interaction of different 
institutions as they conduct ongoing disagreements.  
The next section considers judicial authority in light of the political 
fight that ensues once judges make disputed interpretations of 
constitutional law. It considers political consequences that follow from 
how disagreements are conducted as opposed to how they are resolved. 
More particularly, it looks at how the relative institutional position of 
judges and elected officials influences the conduct of disagreements and 
how this bears on our understanding of the authority judges should have.  
But first we must revisit the distinction between judicial review and 
judicial supremacy. We do so in order to detach judicial supremacy from 
 
 
 39. Id.  
 40. See BURGESS, supra note 38, at 121–26; Walter, Murphy, Who Shall Interpret? The Quest 
for the Ultimate Constitutional Interpreter, 48 REV. POL. 421 (1986). Murphy, for example, endorses a 
modified version of departmentalism in which we assign authority for resolving disagreements based 
on the circumstances in which those disagreements arise. Burgess emphasizes that institutions shape 
people and that a well ordered system of political institutions will expand the range of disagreements 
that can be resolved by appeals to the Constitution.  
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the notion that judges derive authority by enforcing constitutional limits. 
This notion is an important component to the justification of judicial 
review, and it becomes associated with judicial supremacy because 
constitutional theorists have not been careful in distinguishing judicial 
supremacy and judicial review.  
In debating judicial review, constitutional theorists tend to emphasize 
the checking function that judges perform. The strongest justifications, 
such as Hamilton‘s Federalist 7841 and Marshall‘s opinion in Marbury v. 
Madison,
42
 assume the Constitution, as higher law, is binding on the 
institutions it grants authority. Judicial authority to enforce the 
Constitution, according to this view, is a natural consequence of the 
authority the Constitution has as law.
43
 This argument works when the 
Constitution is relatively clear or when there is a transparent line of 
reasoning that connects a judicial decision to the Constitution. 
Judicial review, however, becomes an issue when the Constitution is 
not clear and when we have significant disagreements about its meaning, 
such as those involving race, religion and privacy. Because these 
disagreements do not end when judges interpret the Constitution, theorists 
address the question of judicial authority with an eye to the political 
contests that will ultimately resolve them. And judicial review becomes 
linked with the question of judicial supremacy.  
Theorists, therefore, often address the question of judicial supremacy 
indirectly. They treat it as a supplement to the checking function 
associated with judicial review and assume the reasons that justify judicial 
review also explain why judges‘ views of the Constitution should prevail. 
This is why the question of judicial supremacy lurked in the background 
as an earlier generation of theorists wrestled with the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty.
44
 These theorists defended theories of constitutional 
 
 
 41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 42. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 43. See ROBERT LOWRY CLINTON, MARBURY V. MADISON AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989). 
 44. See ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 2–3, 16–23 (1962). See also 
Kenneth Ward, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty and Legal Realist Perspectives of Law: The Place 
of Law in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 18 J. L. & POLITICS 851, 854–60 (2002). The quest to 
solve the counter-majoritarian difficulty was an attempt to identify a theory of constitutional 
interpretation that that would allow people to consider these conflicts as settled by a pre-existing law. 
Although the problem is associated with Bickel, debates in constitutional theory took a path that 
Bickel warned against. Bickel recognizes that judicial review needs special justification, because 
judges enforce disputed interpretations of constitutional law. Indeed, he criticizes John Marshall‘s 
opinion in Marbury v. Madison for framing the question of judicial review to emphasize its legal 
aspects, judges enforcing pre-existing legal norms, and for ignoring the political reality of judges 
defining the norms they enforce. This is what Bickel means when he says that Marshall‘s opinion not 
only begs the question, it begs the wrong question.  
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interpretation that would allow judges to enforce the Constitution in a non-
controversial manner and, in so doing, sought to justify judicial review 
without addressing the question of why judges should have authority to 
resolve disagreements about what the Constitution means.
45
  
The quest failed; theorists could not identify a method of interpretation 
that would allow us to believe that judges enforce the Constitution itself 
and not a disputed interpretation of the Constitution.
46
 It is our recognition 
of this failure that moves the question of judicial supremacy to the 
forefront, namely what happens after judges advance disputed 
interpretations of constitutional law.
47
   
Nonetheless, these earlier debates have a lingering influence on the 
scholarly discussion of judicial supremacy. By emphasizing how we 
resolve disagreements, scholars assume the same perspective as the earlier 
debates. While theorists once asked if judges would interpret 
constitutional limits correctly, substantive approaches now consider 
whether judges advance good values when they enforce constitutional 
limits. And although structural and descriptive approaches are less 
concerned with the particular limits that judges might enforce, they assess 
judicial authority in terms of how we resolve controversies about these 
limits. They look at who triumphs when judicial and elected institutions 
clash. As a result, the debate about judicial supremacy continues to center 
on the checking function that judges perform without considering all the 
costs associated with the exercise of judicial power. 
The remainder of this essay considers political variables that influence 
what happens after judges advance disputed interpretations of 
 
 
 45. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 1, 101–04 (1980). Ely frames what I have 
called the conventional view of the counter-majoritarian difficulty. See Ward, supra note 44, at 854–
60. In seeking solutions to the counter-majoritarian difficulty, theorists looked to reason, nature and 
tradition to find authoritative legal principles. They also defended principles that they claimed were 
supported by popular consensus, and sought consensus in the political community‘s past, present, and 
perhaps even its future. See generally ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF 
PROGRESS (1970); ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF 
THE LAW (1990); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, 131–49 (1977); Antonin Scalia, A 
Matter of Interpretation, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (Amy Gutmann ed. 1996); Thomas C. Grey, Do 
We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975); Michael J. Perry, The Abortion 
Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Role in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 
1191 (1978); Harry H. Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some 
Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973); J. Skelly Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly 
Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARV. L. REV. 769 (1971). Ely interprets Bickel as making such 
an argument, though Ely‘s interpretation is not consistent with my reading of Bickel‘s view of the 
counter-majoritarian difficulty. SeeJOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, at 69–70. 
 46. See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153 (2002). 
 47. See Whittington, supra note 7, at 778. 
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constitutional law, variables that have great significance for our discussion 
of the appropriate extent of judicial authority and our consideration of 
legislative supremacy as an alternative to judicial supremacy. 
III. LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY: AN INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
This section responds to scholars who are loath to consider 
constitutional reforms that would institute a legislative override because 
they fear that judges will not be able to enforce constitutional limits on 
elected institutions.
48
 On the one hand, judges are not likely to deter a 
strong majority intent on exceeding constitutional limits whether we 
institute judicial supremacy, legislative supremacy, or a regime that leaves 
the status of judicial decisions an open question. On the other hand, the 
institutional position of judges takes on greater significance when there is 
no clear majority favoring an interpretation of the Constitution. In such 
circumstances judges can set a status quo that thwarts a divided majority. 
A legislative override would strengthen the institutional position of elected 
officials relative to judges and thus would narrow the range of decisions 
that would be invulnerable to challenge. But we will see that this range 
would remain fairly broad, notwithstanding the possibility of override. 
There is a growing literature indicating that judges reinforce rather than 
limit governing majorities. The notion that judges align themselves with 
the governing political coalition is not new. It has received empirical 
support in an influential article by Robert Dahl
49
 as well as in a 
burgeoning literature that examines the complex interaction between 
judges and the reigning political regime.
50
 This literature suggests that we 
should not assume that judges will protect us when powerful majorities 
seek to skirt constitutional limits. Ferejohn and Kramer, for example, have 
argued that judicial independence is constrained by institutional pressures 
that lead judges to curtail their own authority.
51
  
 
 
 48. See, e.g, MICHAEL PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 135–36 
(1982); Arkes, supra note 23, at 78–79, 83; RICHARDS, supra note 35, at 291–92; EMERSON, supra 
note 35, at 142; DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 5, at 234. 
 49. Robert A. Dahl, Decisionmaking in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957).  
 50. See Cornell Clayton and J. Mitchell Pickerill, The Rehnquist Court and the Political 
Dynamics of Federalism, 2 PERSP. ON POL. 233–48 (2004); Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your 
Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the United States Supreme 
Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 593–94 (2005). See also, Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian 
Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35–73 (1993). 
 51. See Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 16. 
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It would seem that a legislative override would further weaken an 
already weak Judiciary. But judges are not likely to challenge elected 
officials who are supported by a strong majority regardless of whether we 
institute a legislative override. Judges, for example, will be hesitant to 
enforce constitutional limits for the benefit of particularly unpopular 
claimants no matter the regime.
52
 Indeed, they might be more likely to use 
their authority to legitimate the actions of elected officials.
53
 This is not to 
say that we should ignore the problem of majoritarian tyranny but to 
recognize the need for a non-judicial remedy.
54
  
The Judiciary, by contrast, is more formidable when confronting a 
divided majority. In these circumstances, there are at least two reasons to 
believe that judges will be well positioned to enforce constitutional limits 
notwithstanding a legislative override. First, judges will have allies to 
support their decisions, especially decisions that clearly follow from the 
Constitution. They will derive support from people who believe the 
interpretation is correct and that there is no reason to sacrifice fidelity to 
the Constitution. They will also derive support from people who care little 
about constitutional fidelity but believe that the disputed interpretation 
advances important ends. And though these potential allies were not strong 
enough to prevent elected officials from violating the Constitution, they 
will often have sufficient strength to deter elected officials from reversing 
a judicial decision that vindicates the Constitution, especially after a 
judicial decision signals a conflict of constitutional magnitude. It would be 
harder, then, for elected officials to reverse a judicial decision that checks 
their authority than it was for those same officials to violate the 
Constitution in the first place.  
This suggests the second reason that judges would remain effective in 
enforcing constitutional limits: legislators would have to pass new laws in 
order to control their judicial subordinates. To do so, they would have to 
navigate a process that presents greater obstacles than the one judges now 
 
 
 52. Consider, for example, the Court‘s reversing itself on the death penalty, Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153 (1976), or on the state‘s authority to investigate communists, Barenblatt v. United States, 
360 U.S. 109 (1959). It is also likely that the threat of legislative reprisals deters judges from ruling in 
favor of unpopular claimants. Consider, for example, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), 
limiting the applicability of the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause in a case involving the sexual 
abuse of a young child, or Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), validating the forced 
confinement of United States citizens of Japanese ancestry during World War II.  
 53. See BICKEL, supra note 44, at 71. 
 54. See generally Learned Hand, The Contribution of an Independent Judiciary to Civilization, in 
THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY (I. Dilliard ed., 1953).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol4/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY 339 
 
 
 
 
must navigate to assert their supremacy over elected officials, 
administrators and lower courts.  
In passing an override, legislators do not make the same choice that 
was made when they legislated; they do not choose between the original 
status quo and the second status quo they had set with legislation.
55
 Judges 
introduce a new status quo when they interpret the Constitution in that 
they assign the Constitution a meaning that was at best disputed when the 
legislation was passed. Legislators must choose between this third status 
quo and the second status quo. Moreover, judges can interpret the 
Constitution with an eye toward dividing the legislative coalition that 
established this second status quo. And even in the absence of such 
strategic judging, the coalition would fall apart if some members would 
prefer legislation that instituted yet another status quo, one that achieved 
the policy outcome of the second status quo without conflicting with the 
constitutional interpretation of the third.
56
  
In other words, it is easier for judges to sanction their subordinates 
under the existing regime than it would be for legislators under a system of 
legislative supremacy.
57
 Indeed, we gain a better sense of the 
consequences of legislative supremacy by considering the current position 
of the Judiciary when judges interpret ordinary statutes. Legislative 
overrides occur more than scholars once thought but they are relatively 
rare.
58
 They tend to occur when judges lack knowledge of the current 
Congress‘s preferences, especially in circumstances in which judges seem 
to have no interest in checking legislators and, instead, act as their 
agents.
59
 They are rare because judges can avoid such sanctions so long as 
 
 
 55. To simplify the analysis, I focus on what would happen when the Court strikes down federal 
legislation. But the same analysis will hold when a Congress that is predisposed to favor the decisions 
of state officials reviews constitutional interpretations that limit those decisions. The example should 
not be read as limiting my proposal to cases in which judges have checked federal officials.  
 56. See Pickerill, supra note 14. 
 57. And note well that under the current regime, appellate judges have some success in making 
the law reflect their preferences. See DAVID E. KLEIN, MAKING LAW IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS 
OF APPEALS (2002). 
 58. William N. Eskridge Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L. J. 331, 337, 377–78, 416 (1991). Eskridge identifies conditions that make overrides likely and 
these are circumstances in which judges lack knowledge of the current Congress‘s preferences. 
Eskridge also notes that overrides seldom occur when judicial decisions satisfy a constituency that is in 
a position to block Congressional overrides. Indeed, this is the most important point for my argument. 
Judicial decisions that enforce clear constitutional limits are likely to find such constituencies, and, 
whether we institute judicial supremacy, legislative supremacy, or leave the question undecided, 
judges will not usually attempt to check elected institutions in the absence of such constituencies.   
 59. The most obvious example would be circumstances in which judges invite overrides to 
correct for unintended consequences that clearly follow from a straight forward reading of statutory 
text. See Lori Hausegger & Lawrence Baum, Inviting Congressional Action: A Study of Supreme 
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they interpret the law so that at least one key institutional actor prefers the 
judges‘ interpretation to the competing view expressed in the override—a 
key actor would be anyone in a position to stop the override, such as the 
median vote on a relevant committee, the median vote in each house of 
Congress, or the President, who could veto a bill and thereby shift the 
median congressional vote.
60
 Legislators, therefore, override judicial 
interpretations of statutes when they are unified and, correlatively, when 
there are no important constituencies supporting the judges‘ 
interpretation.
61
 It is not likely that these conditions will arise when judges 
enforce relatively clear provisions of the Constitution.
62 
 
IV. THE JUDICIARY AS A SOURCE OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
Our concern that judges have sufficient authority to enforce 
constitutional limits distracts attention from a different problem. Judges 
might have too much influence when they advance disputed interpretations 
 
 
Court Motivations in Statutory Interpretation, 43 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (1999). Similarly, Jeb Barnes 
has found that overrides succeed when there is dissensus among judges about what statutes entail and 
when such dissensus results from forces other than partisan disagreement among the judges. Barnes 
suggests that in the absence of partisan disagreement, judges seek to clarify the law and act as agents 
for legislators. Consequently, the overrides in these cases do not pertain to contexts in which judges 
check legislators. Indeed, Barnes finds that overrides tend to be ineffective when judges have an 
interest that they are asserting contrary to the interests of legislators, most notably when they defend 
interests of discrete and insular minorities. See JEB BARNES, OVERRULED?: LEGISLATIVE OVERRIDES, 
PLURALISM, AND CONTEMPORARY COURT-CONGRESS RELATIONS 169–71, 178–79 (2004).  
 60. See Eskridge, supra note 58, at 378–80; see also Whittington, supra note 7, at 834; Sven 
Steinmo, American Exceptionalism Reconsidered: Culture or Institutions, in THE DYNAMICS OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS: APPROACHES AND INTERPRETATIONS (Lawrence C. Dodd & Calvin Jillison 
eds., 1994). 
 61. This conclusion finds support from Canada‘s experience after instituting a legislative 
override provision with section 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The legislative 
override has not played a significant role in limiting judicial authority under the Charter, and its 
influence has been experienced mainly at the provincial level of government. See RAN HIRSCHL, 
TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY (2004); Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Models of 
Constitutionalism, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 707, 707–60 (2001); Calvin R. Massey, The Locus of 
Sovereignty: Judicial Review, Legislative Supremacy and Federalism in the Constitutional Traditions 
of Canada and the United States, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1229–1310 (1990). 
 62. See Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28 (1997). On the other hand, our attitude about judicial supremacy 
will influence the strength of the Court‘s institutional position. People who believe they have an 
obligation to defer to judicial interpretations of constitutional law will be more likely to resist efforts to 
overturn precedents, no matter their own view of the Constitution. This might explain why people 
today seem to defer to judicial authority, notwithstanding the Constitution‘s silence on the question. 
And though we should expect them to be more skeptical of judicial decisions were we to institute a 
regime of legislative supremacy in which reversals of courts became familiar events, some people 
would still defer to a Judiciary they perceived as an institution with special competence to say what the 
law is. 
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of constitutional law.
63
 The advantages that help judges enforce clear 
limits on elected institutions also help them to sustain controversial 
interpretations of those limits. Given that such influence might be a source 
of political instability, we should consider whether a legislative override is 
necessary to strengthen the institutional position of elected officials.  
In the current regime, we overturn judicial decisions through the 
Constitution‘s amendment procedures, a process that is much more 
difficult to navigate than the legislative process. The process for 
appointing judges provides an alternative, but it also poses greater 
obstacles than legislating and is not a reliable mechanism for controlling 
judicial authority. As a consequence, the advantage that judicial decisions 
enjoy in the current regime is much greater than would occur in a system 
with a legislative override. The advantage is magnified when people 
disagree about what the Constitution means. These disagreements increase 
the likelihood that judges will attract political support to ensure that their 
decisions survive potential challenges and that they will have great 
influence over constitutional doctrine.  
Constitutional theorists seem to have an endless supply of arguments to 
explain why judges should have such influence. They identify values 
 
 
 63. We must be clear that judges do not enforce constitutional limits in such cases and, instead, 
advance controversial conceptions of what the Constitution means. It begs the question of the 
Constitution‘s applicability if we place judges on the side of the Constitution and assume that elected 
officials act in bad faith when they disagree about its application. 
 Although it is clear that the Constitution places limits on elected politics, we disagree about the 
scope of the limits. Thus, we cannot say with certainty how legislative supremacy would influence the 
Court‘s checking function, because we are not certain about when the function is applicable. Indeed, 
the judicial check becomes a redundancy in circumstances when we are sure of its applicability; 
electoral incentives provide a sufficient check on legislators. We add a judicial supplement because 
people can agree there are additional circumstances in which the limit will be applicable without 
agreeing on what those circumstances are. 
 In deciding whether to institute a legislative override, then, the question is not whether judges will 
be able to enforce constitutional limits; the consensus that animated the constitutional constraint is 
likely to remain evident to people, and either elected officials will be loath to cross such a limit or 
people will support judicial enforcement of a clear constitutional limitation. The question becomes 
what is the best institutional structure for applying the Constitution to a range of circumstances in 
which we agree that elected officials should be limited but are uncertain where the limit should be 
drawn. 
 Although the check on elected officials will be applied differently in a system with a legislative 
override, there would still be a check. It would encompass actions elected officials forego and also 
those thwarted by judicial decisions with enough popular support to be sustained. And while this check 
would be effective over a broader range of circumstances in a system of judicial supremacy or one that 
is neutral between the two, we would not favor these systems in order to ensure that judges enforce 
constitutional limits on elected officials. Rather, our reasons would have to do with how we expect 
judges to define the check itself. The claim that legislative supremacy allows elected officials to ignore 
constitutional limits, then, is really just a substantive argument in different dress; judges are likely to 
make better decisions than elected officials about when the Constitution is applicable.    
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judges advance when they interpret the Constitution. But judges do not 
end our disagreements about constitutional doctrine.
64
 Judicial authority 
becomes a source of instability, when people who continue to contest 
these disagreements believe that judicial decisions place them at an unfair 
disadvantage. Theorists have not addressed adequately the risk of 
instability that follows from the strength of judges‘ institutional position.  
Consider again the First Things symposium. Earlier we noted that the 
symposiasts argue against judicial supremacy, in order to advance a 
substantive conception of what the Constitution means. The symposiasts 
also identify a cost of judicial authority that follows from the institutional 
position judges enjoy. They suggest that judicial decisions sometimes 
disenfranchise people by making it harder to advance their understanding 
of what the Constitution means. The symposiasts contend that judicial 
decisions about privacy and the relationship between church and state have 
made it nearly impossible to advance certain conceptions of constitutional 
law, and many religious people, according to this view, believe that their 
perspectives are no longer relevant to our deliberations about the 
Constitution.
65
 
One might respond that the advantage judges enjoy is mitigated, 
because they respond to the same public opinion that controls elected 
institutions.
66
 Indeed, we have already noted a rich literature that 
associates the exercise of judicial authority with the interests of powerful 
political majorities. But this mistakes the problem that we are considering; 
the problem is not that judges wield a counter-majoritarian authority. It is 
that judicial decisions disenfranchise people who can no longer use the 
legislative process to advance their view of the Constitution and, instead, 
must use a process that poses significantly greater obstacles than the 
legislative process. Both majorities and minorities face this problem when 
they seek to override judicial decisions.
67
  
 
 
 64. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE SUPREME COURT 145–56 (1989); 
Charles H. Franklin & Liane Kosaki, Republican School Master: The U.S. Supreme Court, Public 
Opinion, and Abortion, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 751, 763, 768 (1989). 
 65. Charles W. Colsen, Kingdom in Conflict, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL 
USURPATION OF POLITICS 42 (Richard John Neuhaus ed., 1997); See also Hittinger, supra note 23, at 
29; Hadley Arkes, in THE END OF DEMOCRACY? THE JUDICIAL USURPATION OF POLITICS 39 (Richard 
John Neuhaus ed., 1997).  
 66. See Marshall, supra note 64; Dahl, supra note 49. 
 67. Keith Whittington illustrates this point in a different context. He examines political supports 
that allow judges to exercise authority and avoid reprisals by elected institutions. Whittington 
identifies circumstances in which judges can resolve disagreements within a majority coalition and 
thus advance the interest of some members at the cost to others. Although these political benefits 
would explain why elected institutions would tolerate expansive judicial authority, they also reinforce 
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More significantly, the problem is likely to be associated with 
controversies that manifest deep divisions in the political community such 
as those that animate the First Things symposium. In these circumstances, 
it is folly to believe that judicial decisions do anything more than establish 
the status quo from which an ongoing dispute will proceed. Consequently, 
scholars would do well to concentrate on questions of how best to manage 
such conflicts and the ease with which we can correct mistaken decisions, 
and they should be less concerned with the substance of judicial decisions 
and whether judges represent the majority‘s will.68  
The depth of these disagreements ensures that judges will be in a strong 
position to defend the status quo they set, no matter the side they favor. 
Therefore, judicial decisions achieve a de facto status, when they should 
only be momentary pauses in ongoing discussions about what the 
Constitution means. Indeed, many citizens respect these decisions as if 
they have the same authority as those that clearly follow from the text of 
the Constitution.  
Why would this be a source of political instability? We know that the 
losing side must pursue its values and interests through procedures that are 
much more formidable than the legislative process. The obstacles they 
pose reflect the strong social consensus that should support constitutional 
limits, but the depth of these controversies indicates the absence of such a 
consensus. Judges, instead, have intervened to favor one side and 
exploited an institutional position that allows them to remove the fight 
from the legislative process. Consequently, people suddenly find 
themselves at a significant disadvantage when they try to advance their 
understanding of the Constitution. The fight about what the Constitution 
means has for all practical purposes been preempted, even though a 
considerable number of people continue to contest it.  
Judicial decisions, then, impose a great cost on citizens who reject the 
Judiciary‘s view of the Constitution. While it would be an exaggeration to 
 
 
the point that judges can sustain highly controversial decisions that impose great costs on particular 
groups of citizens. See Whittington, supra note 50; Graber, supra note 50.  
 68. There are scholars who have argued that judges should decide cases with an eye to the 
instability that their decisions might introduce. These scholars recognize the importance of having 
institutions that resolve disagreements in a manner that treats citizens as equals and respects their 
different views. While these arguments are sensitive to the institutional consequences that follow from 
the exercise of judicial authority, they are less concerned with the institutional position of judges 
relative to elected officials. Indeed, they resemble many of the arguments that we have considered in 
that they emphasize how issues should be resolved and miss consequences that follow from the 
interaction of different institutional actors. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT, 
(1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, (1999); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, OUR 
UNSETTLED CONSTITUTION (2001).  
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say that these citizens find themselves opposed to the Constitution itself, it 
is accurate to say that their opponents can claim—with greater 
plausibility—to be on the side of the Constitution. The stakes of 
constitutional litigation increase because people know that to prove such 
claims wrong would require either a constitutional amendment or an act of 
political will that is, at a minimum, more considerable than was necessary 
to advance one‘s views under the previous status quo. 
Moreover, our institutions must bear additional pressure as these 
decisions provide political entrepreneurs an incentive to direct resources 
and energies to the most divisive issues, issues where we are least likely to 
find common ground. These actions, in turn, increase the likelihood that 
controversies will spread to fights that are plausibly related though 
seemingly less volatile—the fight over stem cells is more intense because 
it is seen as an extension of the abortion controversy—and will influence 
fights that have no relationship, because interest groups support candidates 
over a range of issues in order to leverage their influence on particular 
issues. 
By focusing on how we resolve disagreements, scholars underestimate 
the instability that follows when judges exploit their institutional position 
to sustain highly controversial decisions. Consider again Alexander and 
Schauer‘s argument that judicial supremacy facilitates social cooperation 
by enabling judges to perform a valuable settlement function. Critics 
respond by noting that Alexander and Schauer do not address the 
empirical question of whether judges resolve disagreements with the 
finality or coherence necessary to perform this function. Indeed, our 
experience is to the contrary; political controversies linger long after 
judges decide cases, and these controversies have a tendency to unsettle 
doctrine.
69
  
It is more significant, however, that Alexander and Schauer consider 
judicial supremacy as a remedy for disagreement without addressing 
adequately the cost of their cure. Because they focus on the benefits that 
follow when judges settle particular disagreements, they do not consider 
instability that results when judges preempt ongoing discussions about 
constitutional doctrine. They do not see the possibility that citizens might 
believe themselves disenfranchised when issues of constitutional 
interpretation are removed from elected institutions. The possibility is 
 
 
 69. See TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 27–29; KRAMER, supra note 5, at 234–36. This is not a fair 
criticism, however. Alexander and Schauer only claim that people should defer to judicial decisions 
because judges might perform this settlement function, and they indicate that institutional reforms 
would be necessary to increase the likelihood that people will indeed comply. 
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beyond their gaze. What is more, a legislative override would address this 
problem while promoting the rule of law virtues that animate Alexander 
and Schauer‘s argument. People would continue to know what the law is, 
when to be alert to the possibility of doctrinal change, and where to look to 
determine whether change has occurred. And judges would be in a 
position to shape the broader discussion of unsettled doctrinal questions, 
because legislators would have to decide the issues framed by the 
Judiciary.  
Some popular constitutionalists also have recognized potential 
instability resulting from a judicial monopoly on constitutional 
interpretation. Devins and Fisher, for example, contend that constitutional 
doctrine better reflects people‘s views when elected officials have a say 
about what the Constitution means, and that people will not accept the 
authority of the Judiciary or even of the Constitution itself, if they believe 
themselves excluded from deliberations about its meaning.
70
  
Nonetheless, Devins and Fisher view the problem of judicial 
supremacy from the same perspective as Alexander and Schauer: they ask 
who should have a say about what the Constitution means. They differ 
only in concluding that constitutional doctrine will be more representative 
and thus stable, if more people get to speak. They do not address the 
critical question of how loud these voices must be if people are to 
recognize themselves as participants in a discussion about the 
Constitution. To do so, they would have to look beyond how we have 
resolved doctrinal disagreements and consider how judges‘ institutional 
position shapes the field on which these disagreements are contested.
71
  
From this perspective, we see that a legislative override might be 
necessary to ensure that people have an adequate say. Devins and Fisher, 
by contrast, reject legislative supremacy because they believe judges play 
an important role in shaping constitutional values.
72
 And this conclusion 
reflects their focus on how we resolve controversies. They do not ask if 
judges will be able to play the role they envision in a government that 
institutes a legislative override and, instead, seem to assume that judicial 
review would be eliminated in such a government.
73
  
 
 
 70. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 5, at 5, 229. 
 71. Devins and Fisher are more sensitive to these influences when they discuss separation of 
powers cases. They argue that the weakness of judges‘ institutional position prevents them from 
enforcing their decisions when they intervene in conflicts between elected institutions. See id. at 77–
102.  
 72. Id. at 234. 
 73. Many constitutional theorists make a similar mistake. They claim judicial review contributes 
to constitutional politics by making it more deliberative, principled, equitable, or advancing some 
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Consider their discussion of Planned Parenthood v. Casey.
74
 They 
contrast the conception of abortion rights articulated in Casey with the 
original decision in Roe v. Wade;
75
 Casey reaffirms abortion rights, but it 
allows abortion to be regulated. Devins and Fisher contend that Casey is a 
better reflection of citizens‘ attitudes about abortion and that the decision 
is the fruit of political challenges to Roe. Indeed, they think that Casey 
reaches the only viable compromise among competing views.
76
  
It is odd to think of Casey as a compromise, given that the holding does 
not reflect the pro-life position that abortions be significantly curtailed. To 
do so, one must agree with Devins and Fisher that as a practical matter 
abortion would not be significantly curtailed under any tolerable legal 
regime.
77
 More importantly, they seem to assume that the abortion 
controversy had to be resolved in order to move past the pre-Roe regime in 
which abortion was prohibited in nearly every state.
78
 They suggest that 
judicial review was necessary to prevent this outcome, and, by 
implication, that a legislative override would deter the kind of activism 
that was necessary to reach the equilibrium Casey finally achieved.
79
  
While it might be true that abortion law changed because judges 
exercised judicial review, we have seen that judges would retain this 
authority in a system of legislative supremacy. A legislative override 
would only make it easier to challenge the status quo that judges establish 
and thereby increase the likelihood that neither the pro-choice nor the pro-
life position will be made the law of the land. Devins and Fisher do not 
consider this possibility because they focus on how we resolve 
disagreements. As a consequence, they ignore the political instability that 
is introduced when judges resolve controversies that do not lend 
themselves to compromise and preempt ongoing discussions about 
constitutional doctrine.  
 
 
other value. And while their arguments depend on an institutional position that allows judges to 
change the status quo, these theorists say little about how easy it should be for judges to sustain their 
decisions once the status quo has been changed. But barring assumptions about what the substance of 
constitutional doctrine should be, it is difficult to see how constitutional politics would be diminished 
if it were easier to challenge the status quo judges set. 
 74. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 75. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 76. See DEVINS & FISHER, supra note 5, at 137–39, 235–37. Devins and Fisher recognize, 
however, that abortion is too divisive an issue to be resolved by a single decision.  
 77. They imply that eliminating the significant number of abortions that were performed after 
Roe would come at too great a sacrifice of liberty.  
 78. Id. at 236. 
 79. Id. at 234–37. 
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But Devins and Fisher seem to recognize the benefits of leaving these 
controversies unsettled. They suggest that a narrower holding in Roe 
would have reduced the political pressure placed on the Court and would 
have given both pro-life and pro-choice supporters an incentive to pursue 
their disagreement in the legislative arena.
80
 It is puzzling, therefore, that 
they do not consider how a system with a legislative override might 
change the interaction between judges and elected institutions. In such a 
system judges would have an incentive to write narrower decisions to 
avoid reversals, decisions that invite the institutional colloquies that 
Devins and Fisher deem essential to our deliberations about constitutional 
values.
81
 A system of legislative supremacy would promote the stability 
that they believe follows when elected institutions participate in our 
deliberations about the Constitution.
82
  
Finally, Devin‘s and Fisher‘s focus on the need to resolve the abortion 
controversy would explain the strangest aspect of their analysis. They 
claim that Casey is a relatively stable settlement. Although they recognize 
that Roe unleashed forces that brought political upheaval and that abortion 
is a permanent part of a political landscape, they do not see that the 
abortion controversy has continued to be heated after Casey and, perhaps, 
became inflamed with the plurality opinion‘s claim of judicial 
supremacy.
83
 Indeed, this claim is at the center of a recent volume of 
essays arguing against judicial supremacy and also animates the First 
Things Symposium.
84
  
For many, Casey places the Constitution on the wrong side of a culture 
war. While we might dispute the origins and the significance of the 
conflict, it is clear that citizens on both sides assume that the Judiciary is 
the central battleground. This assumption has ramifications for our 
political discourse at all levels of government and for policy decisions that 
are far removed from the conflict itself. These issues would be divisive no 
doubt under any institutional structure. A system of legislative supremacy, 
 
 
 80. Id. at 237. 
 81. Id. at 237–38. 
 82. Devins and Fisher seem to assume that a legislative override would provide final authority to 
say what the Constitution means. They, like Kramer, juxtapose judicial and legislative supremacy and 
endorse a system of coordinate construction, because it affords people a greater role in determining 
constitutional meaning. And, as we saw with Kramer, a political system characterized by legislative 
supremacy might advance this goal.  
 83. Planned Parenhood v. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.  
 84. See THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christopher 
Wolfe ed., 2004); THE END OF DEMOCRACY?, supra note 22. 
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however, is more likely to diffuse them. Such a system reduces the stakes 
of institutional decisions by making them more vulnerable to challenge. 
V. CONCLUSION  
Although there is reason to believe that judicial authority is a source of 
instability, it is premature to conclude that we need a legislative override 
to counteract it. We lack an adequate understanding of the consequences 
likely to follow from the different institutional arrangements we might use 
to manage highly volatile social controversies. Such an understanding will 
be elusive, however, so long as we frame the debate about judicial 
supremacy to emphasize the resolution of disagreements. Indeed, by 
directing attention to the political contests that arise after judges make 
disputed interpretations of constitutional law, we can see that a legislative 
override is not likely to increase the threat of majoritarian tyranny and 
might reduce the instability that follows from controversial judicial 
holdings. 
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